Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 4

August 2007

Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention
of Terrorists
Amos N. Guiora

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Guiora, Amos N. (2007) "Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists,"
Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 19: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Guiora: Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of

QUIRIN TO HAMDAN: CREATING A HYBRID PARADIGM
FOR THE DETENTION OF TERRORISTS
Amos N. Guiora*
I.

INTRODUCTION .....................................

512

II.

CURRENT CONFLICT .................................

513

III.

CURRENT COMBATANT PARADIGM .....................

515

IV.

U.S. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT FOR STATUS OF

TERRORIST DETAINEES ..............................

517

V.

DEFINITION OF THE POW PARADIGM

519

VI.

CRIMINAL LAW PARADIGM FOR DETAINEES ..............

VII.

ISRAELI PARADIGM ..................................
522
A. Trials of Detainees ............................... 522
B. Administrative Hearingsfor Detainees ............... 524

...................

VIII. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS FOR THE HYBRID PARADIGM ....
A. Use of Intelligence Information .....................
B . Torture ........................................
C. The Right to Appeal ..............................
D. The Judiciary ...................................
E. The Right to Counsel .............................

520

525
525
526
527
527
527

* Professor ofLaw, S.J. Quinney College ofLaw, University ofUtah, held senior command
positions in the Israel Defense Forces Judge Advocate General Corps, was Director of the Institute
for Global Security, Law and Policy, and Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. Publications include: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM (Aspen
Publishers 2007); CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION (Oxford Univ. Press
forthcoming 2008); A TERRORISM PRIMER (Aspen Publishers forthcoming 2008); Interrogationof
Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2008); Where are
Terrorists to be Tried, infra note 59. I would like to thank Erin Page (JD, Case '06), Senior
Research Fellow Institute for Global Security, Law and Policy, Presidential Management Fellow
2006, Brian Field (JD candidate, Case '07), Research Fellow Institute for Global Security, Law and
Policy, and Jeffrey Lowe (J.D. candidate, Utah '09), Research Assistant, S.J. Quinney College of
Law, University of Utah for their invaluable research, writing, and editing contributions to this
Article. Special thanks to my father, Professor A.Z. Guiora, for his wise counsel and editorial
insights. This Article is part of a series of articles that examines and analyzes the status ofpost-9/1 1
detainees and the limit of their rights. See infra notes 4 & 18.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

1

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW[

[Vol. 19

F. Maximum and Minimum Imprisonment Terms ......... 528
G. Indefinite Detention .............................. 528
IX.

CONCLUSION .......................................

529

I. INTRODUCTION

Five years after the terror attacks of 9/11,' much disagreement and
uncertainty remains about one of the critical issues in counterterrorism:
who are we fighting? In various efforts to describe the enemy, numerous
terms, or classifications, have been applied. The continued uncertainty is
evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hamdanv. Rumsfeld,2
which represents the Court's most recent foray into the question of
detainee status and rights.
Hamdan's ruling signaled that the Bush Administration could not,
under the guise of executive war-time powers, create its own definitions
to apply to newly established military commissions for terror detainees.3
Although the full impact of this decision has yet to play itself out, the
decision is highly relevant for the thesis that this Article proposes: the
introduction and articulation of the "hybrid paradigm," which I define as
"a true mix of both the criminal law and prisoner of war paradigms
without full Constitutional and criminal procedure rights."4
The hybrid paradigm theme is suggested as the most accurate and
relevant categorization for detainee rights and status. The parameters of
my proposed paradigm include recommendations to address what have
been identified as insufficient procedures in Guantdnamo Bay.5

1. Referring to the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, see September
11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12, 2001), at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 1/chronology.
attack/.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
3. The Court signaled to the Bush Administration that the rules currently governing the
GuantAnamo Bay military commissions were illegal and in need of revamping. The Court held this
by indicating that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was not a blank check for the
Administration to set up these commissions, but rather was more like the "lowest ebb" of power,
similar to Youngstown Steel, requiring further congressional approval for such commissions.
Youngstown St. & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4. See Amos N. Guiora, Hamdan as Heir to the Bram-Brown Progeny (work in progress);
Amos N. Guiora, Know Thine Enemy--Who are We Fighting, CATH.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007).
5. Recent hearings in the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary showed the various
interpretations of the impact of the Hamdan decision, and the response appropriate from the U.S.
Senate. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishinga ConstitutionalProcess Before the S. Comm. on
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This Article's legal and policy recommendations offer a concrete
model for procedural changes that may cure the deficiencies highlighted
in the Hamdan decision.6 While Osama Bin Laden and those of his ilk are
"our enemy," it is critical that the specific legal status of these individuals
be defined in order to determine their rights.7
II. CURRENT CONFLICT
Before delving into the task of defining the status of those engaged in
combat, the conflict itself must first be defined. The current struggle
against terror cannot be termed a "war" in the historical legal sense, as
war, according to international law, only occurs between states. Further,
this conflict cannot be termed a police action, as its universality and scope
make that definition irrelevant. The Israeli government addressed exactly
this nebulous type of conflict, one which is not quite war and not quite a
police action, by creating the term "armed conflict short of war."9 By
defining the present situation as "armed conflict short of war," the
immediate follow-up question, and focus of this Article is how to define
the individuals attacking the nation-state and what rights are they to be
granted.'°

the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Establishinga ConstitutionalProcess] (giving
witness testimony), availableathttp://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1986 (last visited Aug.
15,2007); StandardsofMilitary Tribunals andCommissions (HouseArmed Services Committee),
Sept. 7, 2006 [hereinafter House Armed Services Committee Hearing], available at
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item id=2079&issue, id= 19.
6. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (showing lack of habeas corpus. CIA was given an
exemption in terms of interrogation methods).
7. This may become even more important as the government itself currently struggles to
determine who the "enemy" is. Recent news reports state that the Bush Administration has,
purportedly, disbanded the CIA unit assigned the task of locating Bin Laden, indicating that the
focus is no longer on the single individual, but rather on this amorphous group of "enemy
combatants," a term for which there is no clear definition. See CIA Reportedly Shuts Down Anti-Bin
Laden Unit, CNN, July 4, 2006, availableat www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/alec.html.
8. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
9. Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee-First Statement of the Government of Israel
(Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/FCFDA57E- 15AB-4F50-AFBDBDCE6A289FA8.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
10. Compelling areas of inquiry related to the issues addressed in this Article, including selfdefense, violation of a foreign nation's sovereignty, the significance of a failed state, rule of law
and terrorism, amongst others, will not be discussed.
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This Article suggests that terrorists do not fit into either the criminal
law" paradigm or the prisoner of war 2 paradigm. Rather, individuals
captured in the "war on terrorism"' 3 belong to a unique third paradigm.
Over the years, terms such as enemy combatant, illegal combatant,
unlawful combatant, and illegal belligerent have been used to describe an
individual engaged in combat who either lost his status as a soldier or
never acquired it in the first place. 4
Articulating this definition and determining the status of the enemy are
of the utmost importance for a myriad of reasons. If the lack of definition
for the current conflict continues, then the failure to adequately resolve
other issues will linger, casting a pall over all counterterrorism efforts. As
an example of the legal impact which undefined terms can have, when
President George W. Bush declared "war against terrorism"' 5 he reaped an
unintended consequence. By declaring the conflict a "war," President Bush
essentially defined al-Qaeda as a State and Bin-Laden as a Head of State.
Obviously, the President did not intend to so do.
Though the intent of President Bush's statement was to galvanize the
nation, the legal impact of his phrasing achieved the opposite result. The
President galvanized Bin-Laden. 6 If defined as a war and wars are
between States, then those fighting are soldiers and those captured on the
battlefield must, according to the Geneva Convention, be granted prisoner
of war (POW) status."' The President, neither implicitly nor explicitly,
intended this result.
The most effective way for scholars, policy-makers, and decisionmakers to adequately define the enemy is by determining the rights,

11. As commonly understood and defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "one who has
committed a criminal offense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (8th ed. 2004).
12. The Geneva Convention defines a POW as a soldier who: 1) is part of a command
structure; 2) openly wears his insignia; 3) openly carries his arms; and 4) conducts himself
according to accepted laws of war. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
13. See generally War Against Terror, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECLALS/2001/
trade.center/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
14. See Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (The Court stated that "the spy who secretly
and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war... or an enemy
combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war
by destruction of life or property" are examples of belligerents not entitled to POW status but rather
offend the law of war and are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals).
15. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Statement by the President in his
Address to the Nation, Sept. 11, 2001.
16. I have been told by a leading scholar who is intimately familiar with the Arab world that
Bin Laden was emboldened by the President's words (private conversation).
17. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2).
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privileges, and obligations owed them. Discussion of these three issues
will naturally lead to additional, significant questions: what judicial
process is appropriate for terrorists; what are the limits of interrogation;' 8
what are the limits of detention; 9 what standard of review are they to be
granted;20 and for what crimes may they be tried? 2 ' This Article seeks to
take three important steps in this process: defining the detainees, which
enables the creation of the hybrid paradigm which in turn facilitates the
delineation of procedures for their trial.
III. CURRENT COMBATANT PARADIGM
According to the Geneva Convention, captured soldiers, termed
"prisoners of war," must be returned to their home state upon the cessation
of hostilities.22 Unlike a traditional war, whose culmination is marked by
an agreement between the warring states, the present conflict with
terrorism lacks a universally agreed upon ending or beginning point.
The absence of a foreseeable "end to the conflict" then has a direct and
substantial impact on the definition of a detainee's status. In direct contrast
to both a POW and an individual convicted of having committed a crime,
both of whom know their release parameters, the current detainee23 does
not know his date of release or the circumstances which could bring about
his release.24

18. See Amos N. Guiora &Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence,Interrogationand
Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427 (2006). In addition, I am addressing this issue in a work
in progress tentatively entitled Hamdan as Heir to the Brain-BrownProgeny.
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
20. See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: PresidentBarak's and Chief
JusticeRehnquist's Theories ofJudicialActivism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 51 (2005).
21. Id.
22. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 118.
23. As defined by this Article but defined by the Bush Administration as an enemy
combatant. See infra note 28.
24. In light of the Hamdandecision and the recent DOD memorandum, it is not clear whether
the Administration's changing opinion towards the application of Geneva to detainees will also
impact the definition of "enemy combatant" from this Presidential Order. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); DOD Memorandum, at http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/Forthe-record/documents/20060711 .html (last visited Oct. 8,2007); Presidential Order, see infranotes
25, 32. See supratext accompanying note 2; infra text accompanying note 44.
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The Bush Administration, in section 2 of the November 2001
Presidential Order,25 articulated which individuals will be brought before
the newly created military commissions in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba:
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom
I determine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,
(i)
is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaida;
(ii)
has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit,
acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals
described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection
2(a)(1) of this order.... 26
This definition of an "individual subject to this order" 27 is
uncomfortably vague and subjective. The definition is literally a "catchall," allowing the government extremely wide latitude to determine who
falls under its purview. In light of the fact that such a classification results
in denial of the individual's basic rights, as described in Part VI below,
this is most problematic.
To illustrate the true breadth of the above definition, an "individual
subject to this order ' 28 as suggested by the Presidential Order, can be an

25. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 2 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order of Nov. 13, 2001].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. "An individual subject to this order" has been later defined by the White House to be an
"enemy combatant." See, e.g., Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, June 10, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020610-3.html (last visited Aug. 16,2007);
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, Sept. 20, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/09/20020920-4.html (last visited Aug. 16,2007); Centcom Operation Iraqi Freedom
Briefing, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/
20030331-9.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).
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individual who need not be presently involved in an act of terrorism.
Accordingly, it is sufficient to have merely provided minimal assistance
at any time in the past. Furthermore, the required minimal degree is not
defined, thereby leaving significant grounds for expansive interpretation
on the part of the executive in determining whether an individual is an
enemy combatant.
In the process of reaching the suggested hybrid of rights, the standards
originally articulated by the Bush Administration serve as one extreme.
This extreme suggests that an enemy combatant, as defined by the Bush
Administration, is any individual who has been in contact, passively or
actively, with a terrorist organization. This definition denies the detainee
basic constitutional rights. 29 At the other extreme would be a system aimed
to afford the detainee the full panoply of possible rights, either under the
criminal law paradigm or the prisoner of war paradigm. Neither extreme
is practicable or appropriate. As the discussion below indicates, the proper
system for the hybrid paradigm is somewhere in the middle of these
extremes.
IV. U.S. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT FOR STATUS OF
TERRORIST DETAINEES

In the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Ex ParteQuirin,3 ° the Court used
two different terms in one paragraph to reference the captured Germans.31
29. This assumes that they are entitled to constitutional rights.
30. In Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942), German saboteurs in WWII, captured after
entering the United States on the east coast had been trained to sabotage America's war effort by
destroying factories and the nation's infrastructure. Upon reaching the United States, the German
soldiers buried their uniforms in the sand. Id. Therefore, according to the Geneva Convention, they
were not soldiers as they were not in uniform nor were they openly carrying their weapons. Geneva
Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2). While controversy exists regarding the details of their
capture, the five Germans were brought before a military tribunal established by President
Roosevelt for the specific purpose of hearing the case. Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. at 22. See, e.g.,
Louis FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL 36-37 (University Press of Kansas 2005) (2003)
(chronicling the events of the German saboteurs' trial before military tribunal and eventual
punishment). Though one of the five Haupt, a naturalized American citizen born in Germany came
to the United States at age of 5 and gained citizenship during minority. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 20, the United States argued that he relinquished his American citizenship when he joined the
German Army. Ex Parte Quirin,317 U.S. at 20, 37. The Supreme Court heard the soldiers appeal
regarding the legality of the tribunal's commission. Id. at 1. The Court held in a brief opinion that
the commission was lawful and added they "have no occasion now to define with meticulous care
the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law
of war." Id. at 45-46.
31. Ex ParteQuirin,317 U.S. at 30-31 ("enemy combatant" and "unlawful combatant" are
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This lack of semantic rigor contributed to the Court's failure to offer a
strict definition for the saboteurs. The inability to apply a single expression
suggests that the Court was unwilling or unable to define the enemy.
As the multitude of terms indicates, the Quirin decision, on which the
Bush Administration based its November 2001 Presidential Order,32 cannot
be cited for the proper definition of "enemy combatant." Rather, much like
Justice Potter Stewart's approach to pornography, 33 both the Government
and the Court have chosen not to engage in active discourse or close
examination regarding the specific question of who an enemy combatant
is.
It should be noted that the appellants in Quirin were German soldiers
who lost their status when they purposefully discarded their uniforms.34
Unlike terrorists, who do not belong to a regular army,35 the 1942 Court
applied this enemy combatant definition to individuals who, by all
accounts, had been soldiers. The loss of their status, resulting from their
own actions, enabled the Court to correctly determine that they were not
acting as soldiers at the immediate time of their capture and thus not
entitled to prisoner of war status.36
The Quirin Court's failure to strictly define a term for the saboteurs
before them is problematic from the legal, judicial, policy, and practical
perspectives. Rather than "define the issue," the executive and judicial
branches today, with congressional acquiescence, have simply continued
the "tradition" of not defining the combatant.
While the Court has never expanded upon its definition, or lack thereof,
in Quirin,37 the tide may now be changing in light of the Hamdan
decision. 38 As the dust settles from this enormously significant decision,
the U.S. government and Congress appear literally pushed by the Court to
fully define the status and rights of detainees. 39 This Article recommends

used in the same paragraph).
32. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supranote 25.
33. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (not "attempting
to define what may be indefinable... but I know it when I see it.").
34. Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
35. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2).
36. ExParte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
37. Id.at 1.
38. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
39. See Recent hearings in the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary showing the various
interpretations of the impact of the Hamdandecision, and the response appropriate from the U.S.
Senate. SeeEstablishinga ConstitutionalProcess,supranote 5 (giving witness testimony). House
Armed Services Committee Hearing,supra note 5 (regarding the recent hearings in the U.S. Senate
discussing what the appropriate legislative response to Hamdan ought to be).
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a practical blend of law and policy considerations both for the definition
and subsequent implementation of a hybrid of the criminal law and POW
paradigms.

V. DEFINITION

OF THE POW PARADIGM

In discussing what rights should be granted to detainees, there are two
pools of rights from which to draw suggestions: the criminal law paradigm
and the prisoner of war paradigm. The Geneva Convention defines a POW
as a soldier who: 1) is part of a command structure; 2) openly wears his
insignia; 3) openly carries his arms; and 4) conducts himself according to
accepted laws of war. 40 Accordingly, a soldier who is part of a regular
army of a State easily meets this test.4 ' It has been argued elsewhere 42 that
members of al-Qaeda do in fact belong to an organization with a command
structure.43 Nevertheless, they unquestionably do not meet the other three
parts ofthe Geneva Convention definition. Detainees suspected of terrorist
acts also fail at least the last three parts of this definition.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush Administration
determined that al-Qaeda members were not entitled to the full protections
of the Geneva Convention.' Based on this decision, the Administration
held that other than food, water, shelter and basic medical care the
detainees were to be denied basic rights guaranteed by the Geneva
Convention. 45 Further, because of this determination, the administration
40. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2).
41. InEx ParteQuirin,the Court held that the saboteurs were not soldiers as they had buried
their uniforms upon reaching the United States and therefore equated them to spies. Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).
42. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What is an "Unlawful Combatant,"and Why It Matters: The
Status of DetainedAl Qaedaand Taliban Fighters, FINDLAW, Jan. 23, 2002 (if members of alQaeda do belong to a command structure, then they might be termed part of a regular army state
by meeting element No. 1 of the Geneva Convention's definition of Prisoner of War), http://writ.
corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html.
43. Id.
44. See Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, to Commander, Department of Defense Joint Task
Force 170, in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON

167-68 (2004) [hereinafter TORTURE AND TRUTH]; Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense, to Commander USSOUTHCOM (Jan. 15, 2003), in TORTURE AND TRUTH,
supra, at 183; Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in TORTURE AND TRUTH, supra at 115-16.
45. See, e.g., Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 21, 84, 87. "Subject to the provisions
of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be
held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during
the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary." Id. art. 21.
TERROR
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held that the detainees could be subject to harsh interrogation46 and
indefinite detention, 4 and denied independent judicial review. 4 However,
in light of the Hamdan decision, the administration has reversed course,
indicating that the detainees are in fact entitled to Geneva Convention
protection.49
VI. CRIMINAL LAW PARADIGM FOR DETAINEES
° criminal law
A second possible paradigm is the domestic, Article lI,5
paradigm. Just as the prisoner of war paradigm is not applicable in full,
terrorists are not regular criminals and the criminal law process is, thus, an
inappropriate venue.
However, the criminal law paradigm is useful to suggest a variety of
possible rights which could be granted in part. Specifically, the criminal
law process is predicated on an array-of fundamental premises: 1) a
defendant presumed innocent until proven guilty; 2) the submission of
evidence to a court of law; 3) a right to confront witnesses;5" 4) a right to

A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws
of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged
to have been committed by the prisoner of war. In no circumstances whatever
shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the
essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized,
and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights
and means of defence provided for in Article 105.
Id. art. 84. "Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the
Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed
forces of the said Power who have committed the same acts." Id. art. 87.
46. See Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in TORTURE AND TRUTH, supra note 44, at 115.
47. Brief for the Respondents at 14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 036696).
48. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 25, § 4.
49. See Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense England to DOD officials (July 7,
2006) (indicating that the detainees are in fact covered by the Geneva Convention), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/genevaconvdoc.pdf
50. U.S. CONST. art. III.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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remain silent;5 2 5) a right to appeal to an independent judiciary;53 and 6) a
right to trial by a jury of peers.5 4
This discussion should not be misunderstood as it is not meant to
recommend the adoption of these rights in full with respect to individuals
detained in the aftermath of 9/11. However, equally important, it should
also not be understood as a recommendation that terrorists not be granted
certain rights. The dilemma is in determining and implementing the
appropriate balance between legitimate national security needs and equally
legitimate rights of the individual.
Democratic states cannot afford the luxury of refusing all rights for
suspected terrorist detainees. 5 The hybrid paradigm seeks to propose what
criminal law rights can be granted to the detainee suspected of terrorist
acts, who cannot be treated as a criminal as defined and fully protected by
the criminal law process. One basic criminal law right which I propose
cannot be applied to the terrorist is the right to confront accusers.
Counterterrorism is based on information gleaned from intelligence
gathering. 6 Under the criminal law paradigm the prosecution would be
required to make intelligence sources available for cross-examination. 7
The overwhelming risk of obligating such sources to appear in front of the
suspect is obvious and significant.5"
Further, applying the criminal law paradigm in full to terrorists would
not only require the outing of intelligence sources, but also require
prosecutors to submit physical evidence to the court, a task often not
possible in the world of counterterrorism intelligence. Conversely,
adopting a legal regime whereby the prosecutor could submit sensitive

52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III (creating an independent judiciary).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. President Barak, head of the Israeli Supreme Court, expresses this by saying that while
terrorists can fight however they want, "a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its
back." Aharon Barak, Foreword. A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 148 (2002).
56. Intelligence gathering largely emanates from two sources: HUMINET, which is human
intelligence, and SIGNET, which is signal intelligence. Guiora & Page, supra note 18, at 428.
HUMINET depends on individuals willing to act as sources for a variety of reasons. Id. For a fuller
description of this, see Amos Guiora, Targeted Killingas Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 319 (2004) (describing how intelligence information is used).
57. Id.
58. See Statement ofAnti-Defamation League and American Jewish CongressB'naiB'rith
International,Hadassah,and the Jewish Councilfor PublicAffairs on H.R. 2121-The Secret
Evidence RepealActBefore the House Committee ontheJudiciary,106th Cong. (2000) (statement
of Thomas C. Homburger, Vice Chair of the Anti-Defamation League's National Commission),
availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/homburger.html.
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intelligence without granting the defendant the full right to confront
certain witnesses, or evidence, would permit the prosecution to base a case
substantially on sensitive intelligence information. Such a practice, as
noted by the Supreme Court's criticism of the Mobb's Declaration 9 in
Hamdi,6 °can be beneficial to the state, but dangerous to the detainee.61 The
critical issue, then, is determining what rights should be included in the
hybrid paradigm.
VII. ISRAELI PARADIGM

Thus far this Article has focused on the current situation for detainees
in Guantandmo Bay and two existing models to draw from in the
development of the proper procedures for the "hybrid paradigm."
However, before moving to the recommended set of procedures for this
paradigm, it may be useful to explore the procedures of a nation that has
had a great deal of experience with counterterrorism. In Israel, there are
two separate methods for trying terrorists: criminal trials and
administrative hearings.
A. Trials of Detainees
The trials take place in one of two venues: either in Israel Defense
Force (IDF) military courts62 or in Israeli civilian courts, with similar rules
of criminal procedure and evidence. The IDF military courts should not be
confused with a court martial, as a court martial only tries soldiers.63
Procedurally, the Israeli model differs from the current military
commission system in Guantdnamo Bay, where judges, prosecutors and
59. The Mobb's Declaration was a statement supplied by a DOD official, summarizing the
intelligence information known to the authorities regarding the activities of a particular defendant.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 512-13 (2004). The material is used in detention hearings. Id.
In Israel, the classified information presented to the Judge regarding a defendant was previously
referred to as "negative security material" and reflected the known intelligence based on
HUMINET and SIGNET alike. Amos N. Guiora, Where are Terroriststo be Tried-A Comparative
Analysis ofRights Grantedto Suspected Terrorists,56 CATH. U. L. REv. (2007) [hereinafter Where
are Terroriststo be Tried]. The material was used for a variety of criminal law and administrative
sanctions. The primary issue is the reliability of the sources and whether the material is
corroborated.
60. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
61. Id. at 507.
62. See Where are Terroriststo be Tried,supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians accused of terrorism acts are tried in the
Military Court, even if the act was committed in Israel proper (the pre-1967 borders). Where are
Terroriststo be Tried, supranote 59.
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defense attorneys are all members of the U.S. armed services Judge
Advocate General Corps. In the Israeli system, only the prosecutors and
judges are career military officers, but they do not serve in the same unit.
Defense counsel are either Palestinian lawyers or Israeli lawyers (Jewish
and Arab alike), but never IDF officers.' The defendants are Palestinian
residents of the West Bank 5 accused of having committed security crimes
against Israelis or the State of Israel, or accused of harming Palestinians
suspected of collaborating with Israel.66
When the accused is not a Palestinian or in otherwise extraordinary
circumstances, Israeli civilian courts will hear such trials.6 7 The trial
process itself is similar to the American criminal system where the
defendant is innocent until proven guilty; the state submits a charge sheet
and the defendant may admit guilt.68 Guilty verdicts are based either on the
defendant's confession or on witness testimony heard in open court.6 9
Classified intelligence information cannot be submitted to a court for
purposes of conviction. However, classified information can be the basis
both for an initial detention of up to eight days and an extension of such
detention. Furthermore, the Israeli legal regime differs from the current
Guantdnamo Bay military commissions in that it provides a right of appeal
to an independent judiciary.7"

64. LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT, THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA 159-60 (2005).

65. Post-disengagement from the Gaza Strip, IDF Military Courts do not have jurisdiction
over Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip.
66. The relevant offenses are codified in a series of laws largely inherited by the IDF from
the British Mandate. David A. Kirshbaum, Israeli Emergency Regulations and the Defense
(Emergency)Regulations of 1945, Israel Law Resource Center, availableat www.Geocities.com/
savepalestinenow/emergencyregs/essays/emergencyregsessay.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).
67. Based on person knowledge and experience of the author while holding senior command
positions in the Israel Defense Forces Judge Advocate General Corps, the number of such cases is
a mere handful; a prime example was the trial of Marwaan Barghouthi, a Palestinian resident of the
West Bank accused ofmurdering 27 Israelis. Information on Marwan and Ahmed Barghouti, Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://www.mfa.gov.ilUMFA/MFA
Archive/2000-2009/2002/4/Infonrmation%20on%20Marwan%2and%2OAhmed%2OBarghouti%2%2015-Apr. In a controversial decision, the then Attorney General of the State of Israel, Elyakim
Rubenstein decided that for a variety of nonlegal considerations Mr. Barghoutti would be tried in
the Tel Aviv district court. Where are Terroriststo be Tried,supranote 59. Similar to the military
court structure, three judges sit in the civilian trials.
68. Similar to large American cities, approximately 90% of defendants plead out.
69. Similar to the U.S. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which guarantees a right to
confront the accuser, open confession or testimony is the essence of the Israeli adversarial system.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
70. Upon conviction in the civilian court, the defendant may appeal from the magistrate court
(lowest level) to district court and then to the Supreme Court. The severity of the original charge
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B. Administrative Hearingsfor Detainees
The other regime available in Israel for detaining suspected terrorists
is administrative detentions. Should the General Security Services (GSS)
determine that the intelligence information cannot be submitted to an open
court of law, 7' the individual will be "administratively detained. 72
Additional administrative sanctions include deportations, assigned
residence, and house demolitions.73
A GS S recommendation that an individual be administratively detained
must be approved by the IDF Legal Advisor prior to the West Bank
Military Commander signing the detention order.74 Should the military
commander sign the detention order, the affected individual is brought
before a military judge, not for a trial, 75 but rather for a review of the
intelligence leading to the detention. 76 Lastly, if approved by the judge
(rank of Major), then a higher ranking judge (rank of Lt. Col. and Col.)
reviews the detention order.77 Petitions for appeal may be filed against
these decisions to the High Court of Justice.78
The initial six month detention period is indefinitely renewable.79
However, each extension period is reviewable by an independent

determines which court (either the magistrate or district court) initially hears the case. If the
defendant is convicted in the military court, the Military Court of Appeals hears the appeal. Such
cases may also be brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.
71. This determination would be based either on fear that harm will befall the human source
(human intelligence; HUMINET) or on concern that sensitive intelligence gathering methods will
be exposed (signal intelligence; SIGNET).
72. Reg. 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulation of 1945, as described in Kirshbaum,
supra note 66. It should be noted that the sanction ofadministrative detention has been used against
both Palestinians and Israeli Jewish extremists alike. Amos Guiora, Counter-Terrorismand the
Rule ofLaw, Istanbul Conference ofDemocracy and Global Security (in press).
73. Reg. 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulation of 1945, as described in Kirshbaum,
supra note 66.
74. The recommended detention cannot exceed six months. Id.
75. Neither the detainee nor his attorney has the right to examine the information on which
the detention is based. Id.
76. During the course of the hearing (based on the author's experience as ajudge, prosecutor,
and legal advisor with respect to administrative detentions), the judge fulfills a double-role: that of
judge and defense attorney (civilian; not military akin to the Military Court regime) alike whose
role is, at best, highly minimal.
77. See supra note 76.
78. See supra note 76. I have sat in on these hearings and decisions of mine have been
appealed to the High Court of Justice.
79. Kirshbaum, supranote 66.
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judiciary.8" While this may sound as if the legal regime intends to establish
a regime of indefinite detention, the multilayered approval process
required prior to each detention in conjunction with a complete review
every six months creates institutionalized controls."
VIII. RECOMMENDED

REVISIONS FOR THE HYBRID PARADIGM

This Article has, thus far, examined the current system of rights and
procedures for detainees, 8 2 examined two traditional paradigms of criminal
law and prisoners of war,8 3 and discussed current practices in Israel that
can serve as a model.84 The discussion, now, must turn to the proposed
rights to be granted to the detainee in the hybrid paradigm.
The hybrid paradigm is philosophically and jurisprudentially founded
on the principle that the accused must be brought to some form of trial, but
that the American criminal law process is inapplicable to the current
conflict. Accordingly, in order to guarantee the suspect certainrights and
privileges, the hybrid paradigm will be predicated on the following: the
use of intelligence information, interrogation methods that do not include
torture, the right to appeal to an independent judiciary, the right to counsel
of the suspect's own choosing, known terms of imprisonment, and
procedures to prevent indefinite detention.
A. Use ofIntelligence Information
First, the hybrid paradigm must enable the prosecution to introduce
intelligence information which the judge would review and use for
purposes of deciding guilt or innocence. While intelligence information
cannot be the sole basis for the decision, it can be used to strengthen the
holding.
This provision is the most severe break from the criminal law
paradigm. Unlike the criminal law process, where the prosecutor is
obligated to put forth all available evidence, the hybrid paradigm

80. See supra note 76.
81. Human rights organizations have been highly critical of the process described above. See,
e.g., Amnesty International, Israel: FurtherInformation on Fear of Torture and Ill-Treatment!
Detention Without Charge, 'Abel al-Nasser Quzmar, Sept. 4, 2003; Human Rights Watch,
BackgroundBriefing: Israel's Proposed "Imprisonmentof Combatantsnot Entitledto Prisonerof
War Status Law," June 2000.
82. See supraParts II-IV.
83. See supraParts V-Vl.
84. See supraPart VII.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

15

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

recognizes that in the world of counterterrorism, it is not always possible
to do so. However, this standard needs to be restricted whereby the
prosecution may not use the intelligence information unless and until a
judge has determined85 that presenting the information to the defendant
poses a significant threat to national security. Further, if traditional
evidence is available and sufficient for the court to order the suspect's
continued detention, the state must submit the criminal law evidence,
rather than relying on the classified intelligence information.
In the hybrid paradigm, the judge's determination on these questions
of admissibility must favor the defendant's rights. Despite Justice
O'Connor's unfortunate words in Hamdi, where she indicated that "the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable
one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided,"86 I argue that on the
contrary, the Constitution does not contain a rebuttable presumption that
favors the state at the expense of a defendant's rights.
B. Torture
Secondly, although full Miranda rights need not be extended to the
suspect upon his detention, interrogation based on torture is inadmissible.87
The 1984 Convention Against Torture 88 must be applied when detainees
are interrogated as interrogation based on torture is both legally and
morally wrong. 89 Given the context in which detainees are held as
suspected terrorists, it is permissible for them to be subjected to a more
thorough interrogation (as distinguished from torture in a ruling of the
Israeli High Court of Justice),9" provided that the interrogator has
reasonable cause to believe the specific detainee either has information
which will lead to the arrest of another terrorist or is suspected of having
committed an act of terrorism himself.9"

85. The judge shall construe all the information in a manner most favorable to the defendant.
86. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004).
87. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1, openedfor signatureDec. 10, 1984.
88. Id.
89. See Guiora & Page, supra note 18, at 429.
90. HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel & General Sec.
Serv. [1999], available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.html (last
visited Aug. 17, 2007).
91. Id.
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C. The Right to Appeal
Third, all judicial decisions must be appealable to a higher court for
independent judicial review. A strict interpretation of the Constitution
would disallow a system whereby a defendant, who does not know the
charges for which he is held, is prohibited from appealing the unlimited
detention decision. A right to independent judicial review must be
afforded. This not only protects the right of a defendant to appear before
a separate and independent judiciary, it also protects the integrity of the
system itself.
D. The Judiciary
Fourth, the detainee should be tried before three qualified judges
instead of a jury; the judges may be either civilian or military. There is a
need to establish a domestic terror court in which the trial by "a jury of
one's peers" is inapplicable to the detainees, largely because of the
introduction of classified, complex intelligence information. The role of
this independent judiciary in the process is critical to ensure active review
of the state's actions.92 The November 2001 Presidential Order, which did
not provide for independentjudicial review at Guantdnamo Bay,93 has been
heavily criticized for this deliberate omission. 94 The procedures suggested
in this Article would allow for appeal in the U.S. District Courts, U.S.
Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
E. The Right to Counsel
The defendant may be denied the right to see an attorney for a limited
number of days, but only after a judicial decision, based on the
recommendation of interrogators that a meeting between the detainee and
his attorney poses a viable security risk. Similarly, the defendant need not

92. See Guiora & Page, supranote 20, at 51.
93. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 25, § 4.
94. See, e.g., Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, The Military Commissions-A Possible
Strength Giving Way to a Probable Weakness-and the RequiredFix, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
523 (2004); Randolph Moss & Edward Siskel, The Least Vulnerable Branch: Ensuring the
Continuity of the Supreme Court, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015 (2004); Irma Alicia Cabrera Ramirez,
Unequal Treatment ofUnited States Citizens: Erodingthe ConstitutionalSafeguards, 33 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 207 (2003); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of
Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 1001 (2004).
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agree to be represented by assigned military counsel, rather he can choose
to be represented by a civilian attorney only.95
F. Maximum and Minimum Imprisonment Terms
Sixth, there must be clearly stated terms of imprisonment, which is a
critical component of the criminal process, and has not been incorporated
into the military commission rules in Guantfnamo Bay. In order to
facilitate a system whereby a detainee may properly defend himself, he
must be made aware of the charges against him and the maximum term of
imprisonment. This affords him the ability to better weigh available
options in the preparation of his defense.
G. Indefinite Detention
Lastly, the defendant cannot be held indefinitely without court order.
In order to most effectively balance the suspect's basic rights and the
equally legitimate security considerations of the state, the detainee may be
held for a period not to exceed five days prior to a judicial hearing in his
presence. Continuing detention must be by court order, and only by court
order. The extension of remand will be by court order for a finite,
renewable, period and this five day period can be extended upon approval
by an appellate level judiciary. 96 Should the court deny the state's request
for further remand, an appeal could be heard by an appellate court. This
process may be repeated for up to one year, so as to comply with the right
to a speedy trial in the United States. 97 At the end of one year, the state
must either bring charges against the detainee or release him. A petition
against this release may then be made by the Attorney General before the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Further, the basis for the request to extend the five day detention must
be made by the head of the specific interrogation team who has firsthand
knowledge of the intelligence information relevant to the particular
suspect. The head of the team will be required to sign an affidavit filed

95. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Commissions, Military Commission Instructions,
Military Commission Instruction 5, Qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel, available at
http://www.defenselink.mit/news/Aug2OO4/commissionsinstructions.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2007). According to the President Order establishing the military commissions, civilian defense
counsel must be U.S. citizens, have requisite security classifications and are retained by the
defendant at his own cost.
96. The U.S. District Court hearing this request may extend the detention for an additional
15 days.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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with a court and also, if the Court so orders, testify as to the dangers posed
to the nation's security by the suspect. This requirement, though perhaps
a burden for the state, 98 will ensure that detainees are not held without
cause. The Court, in hearing a petition for extending an administrative
detention, should apply strict scrutiny. 99 Both in principle and in reality,
this is the only protection offered to the suspect as neither he nor his
counsel is entitled to review the intelligence submitted. °°
IX. CONCLUSION

Given the originally mentioned failures,l° it is time for the government
to establish a system of process and rights for detained individuals. To
continue the current course is ultimately a violation of constitutional and
of international law. In addition, and perhaps most critically, it is a blight
on the moral standards of the United States.
To begin, in order for the government to even consider bringing
someone into the hybrid paradigm, the state must have credible
intelligence information 2 or criminal evidence strongly indicating that the
individual is actively engaged in a terrorist organization.0 3 Accordingly,
citizens and noncitizens alike who are suspected, based on a "strong
indication," of having an involvement in terrorism may be designated
"enemy combatants" as defined by the Bush Administration" or
"detainees" as defined in this Article. Upon such designation, and

98. Regarding "burden," it is instructive to recall the words of President Aharon Barak of the
Israel Supreme Court in Marab. HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002].
The Court commented that bureaucratic consideration encountered by the State is not a mitigating
circumstance enabling the State to deny detainee's basic rights even (perhaps particularly) in the
context of armed conflict. Id.
99. See President Barak's statement in Ajuri that 'security of the State' is not a 'magic word'
that prevents judicial review," and O'Connor's assertion in Hamdithat "a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri
v. IDF Commander in West Bank at 375 [2002]; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
100. For a description of the administrative detention process in place in Israel, please see
Amos N. Guiora, Counter-Terrorismand the Rule ofLaw, Istanbul Conference on Democracy and
Global Security (in press).
101. See supra note 6.
102. For a discussion of intelligence information, see Amos Guiora, TargetedKillingas Active
Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319 (2004).
103. Actively engaged shall be defined as follows: participating in the planning of an attack,
providing harbor to those committing the attack, ensuring the availability of financial resources,
providing significant logistical support or actually performing the act.
104. See supra note 28.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

19

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

subsequent to detention, the individual shall then be subject to the sevenpart process recommended above.
The hybrid paradigm seeks to balance competing interests present in
any national security situation. Trial by a civilian court, with special rules
and appeal to a regularly functioning civilian court of appeals, 0 5 represents
a balanced approach focusing on the rights and needs of both the detainee
and the government. In contrast to the system established by the Bush
Administration in the wake of 9/11,106 the model suggested in this Article
represents important guarantees that should be afforded to those suspected
of having committed acts of terrorism balanced against the national
security needs of society.
Further, the various terms applied to this new category must be
streamlined. It is critical for society to define who the enemy is.
Accordingly, this new paradigm, which is indeed a mixture of multiple
systems, should be called the "hybrid paradigm" and apply to detainees.
This model, which draws from the criminal law and prisoner of war
paradigms should be the model for the future since the two other models
are inapplicable to and inappropriate for terrorism. Terrorism is neither a
criminal act nor warfare. Terrorists are enemy combatants who must be
granted some rights in the context of a judicial system. Although they
should not be granted full rights, a democratic society cannot afford to
deny detainees all rights. The model suggested in this Article reflects that
reality, protecting national security while also protecting the rights of the
individual.

105. In Milligan the Supreme Court held against the establishment of military commissions
as the civilian courts in the State of Indiana were open and functioning and, therefore, according
to the Court, there was neither need nor justification for military commissions. Ex ParteMilligan,
71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
106. See supra note 25.
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